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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
Legal Momentum, the Women’s Legal Defense 
and Education Fund, is a national non-profit gender 
justice advocacy organization.  For nearly 50 years, 
Legal Momentum has been advancing equal rights 
for girls and women through legislative efforts, 
impact litigation, and through direct representation 
of clients. Its areas of focus have included 
employment law, campus safety, sports, and all 
forms of gender-based violence. In connection with its 
commitment to ending gender-based violence, Legal 
Momentum was instrumental in drafting and helping 
to pass the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”) in 
1994 and its subsequent reauthorizations in 2000, 
2005, and 2013. Legal Momentum considers sex 
trafficking to be one of the most extreme forms of 
violence against women.  In 2013, the Trafficking 
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”) 
was reauthorized as part of VAWA, criminalizing the 
sex trafficking of minors. Legal Momentum is 
involved in efforts to end gender-based violence 
perpetrated online, including online sex trafficking 
and other sex-based cybercrimes. Legal Momentum 
has partnered with non-profit organizations and 
cities throughout the country to end online 
commercial sexual exploitation of women and girls, 
including sex trafficking on Backpage.com. 
Additionally, for four decades, through its award-
                                                          
1 Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amici certify that no counsel 
for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, 
and no persons other than amici curiae or their 
counsel made a monetary contribution to its 
preparation or submission.  
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winning National Judicial Education Project 
(“NJEP”), Legal Momentum  has been educating 
judges and court officials on issues related to gender-
based violence against girls and women, including 
cyber-related violence. 
Cindy Hensley McCain serves as co-chair of the 
Arizona Governor’s Council on human trafficking 
and on The McCain Institute’s Human Trafficking 
Advisory Council.  She is dedicated to efforts to 
reduce human trafficking in Arizona and throughout 
the United States, and works to improve the lives of 
victims of human trafficking.  Through her work with 
The McCain Institute, she has formed critical 
partnerships with anti-trafficking organizations to 
combat online sex trafficking.  Mrs. McCain is an 
outspoken advocate for victims bought and sold on 
Backpage.com. 
Florida Abolitionist, founded in 2009, is an anti-
trafficking organization committed to the prevention 
of sex trafficking and to crisis intervention for sex 
trafficking victims.  A leading service provider in the 
Greater Orlando area, it runs Orlando’s local 
trafficking hotline.  It also conducts widespread 
outreach and awareness campaigns throughout 
Central Florida, including to juvenile justice centers.  
As part of its extensive organizing and advocacy 
efforts, Florida Abolitionist co-founded the Greater 
Orlando Human Trafficking Task Force and has 
partnered with the Orange County School Board for 
prevention education.   
The National Center on Sexual Exploitation 
(“NCOSE”) is a leading national organization 
exposing the links between all forms of sexual 
exploitation.  NCOSE embraces a mission to defend 
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human dignity and to advocate for the universal 
right of sexual justice, which is freedom from sexual 
exploitation, objectification, and violence.  To this 
end, NCOSE operates on the cutting edge of policy 
activism to combat corporate and government 
policies that foster exploitation, to advance public 
education and empowerment, and to foster united 
action through leading the international Coalition to 
End Sexual Exploitation. 
The Organization for Prostitution Survivors 
(“OPS”) is a Seattle-based non-profit organization 
that provides social services to women and girls who 
are victims of sex trafficking and commercial sexual 
exploitation. OPS addresses the harm caused by sex 
trafficking by providing survivors with supportive 
services.  Sex trafficking is a significant problem in 
Seattle/King County and the State of Washington, 
affecting the most vulnerable among us. Most of 
OPS’s clients were recruited as minors, often 
between the ages of 12-14 years old, and have been 
trafficked online.  Backpage.com is one of the 
predominant sites because exploiters have found it a 
relatively safe and protected place to advertise. As a 
social service agency, OPS is reminded, on a daily 
basis, of the harm that online sex trafficking causes 
women and children, facilitated by sites such as 
Backpage.com.  
Rising International is a direct service provider to 
sex trafficking victims in Northern California.  In 
addition, Rising International founded and manages 
Safe and Sound, a local human trafficking prevention 
program.  The program is designed specifically for 
foster youth and homeless adults, who are vulnerable 
to being trafficked online via sites like 
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Backpage.com.  The program has been successful on 
many levels and is currently being offered to twenty 
high schools. 
Sojourner Center is a non-profit organization, 
founded in 1977, that provides emergency shelter, 
transitional housing, and other services to people 
that have been affected by domestic violence and 
human trafficking.  Serving nearly 10,000 
individuals each year, it is one of the nation’s largest 
domestic violence shelters and serves numerous 
victims of human trafficking, including those sold on 
Backpage.com.  Sojourner Center also hosts the 
SAFE Action Project, which educates the community 
that sexual exploitation through force, fraud, and 
coercion are all forms of domestic violence, and that, 
with a coordinated community strategy, human 
trafficking can be stopped.  Sojourner Center views 
sexual abuse, including child trafficking, as a public 
health epidemic that affects the entire nation. 
StolenYouth is dedicated to raising awareness to 
support the rescue and recovery of sex trafficked 
youth in Seattle and across Washington State. 
StolenYouth has piloted a landmark high school 
curriculum that recruits young men as allies.  It has 
trained 1,500 hotel and business personnel to 
recognize trafficking as it happens, and provided 
vital recovery services for over 200 trafficked youth, 
many of whom were trafficked online by 
Backpage.com or other sites. Research suggests that 
there are over 500 trafficked kids on Seattle streets 
alone and the median age of these children is just 13 
years old. The problem is growing, and without 
intervention, it is estimated that 77% of trafficked 
girls will be commercially exploited as adults. 
5 
StreetLightUSA is a globally recognized 
residential center providing holistic care to girls ages 
11-17 across the United States who have been 
victimized by child sex trafficking or experienced 
sexual trauma.  Founded in 2009 and based in the 
Greater Phoenix area, StreetlightUSA promotes 
awareness, advocates for prevention, and provides 
24-hour direct care to victims on a safe and secured 
campus.  StreetlightUSA played an instrumental role 
in the passage of Arizona’s House Bill 2699, which 
penalized perpetrators selling or having sex with 
children under the age of 14.  The organization also 
formed a key partnership with Arizona State 
University (“ASU”) to advance its public awareness 
efforts.  StreetlightUSA sees firsthand, and on a 
daily basis, the trauma that sex trafficking has on 
girls, and the ease with which platforms such as 
Backpage.com allow girls to be sold online for sex. 
YWCA Silicon Valley is a Santa Clara County 
non-profit organization founded in 1905 with a 
mission to eliminate racism and empower women.  
YWCA Silicon Valley provides crisis response, 
intervention and support services to people of all 
genders who are survivors of human trafficking, sex 
trafficking, and the commercial sexual exploitation of 
children.  Their services for survivors of sex 
trafficking include in-person response, 24-crisis line, 
shelter, housing, counseling, therapy, case 
management, and advocacy.  As a social service 
agency and provider of direct service for survivors of 
violence, the organization is aware of the severe 
harms caused by online sex trafficking, particularly 
to women and children.  Backpage.com is one of the 
predominant sites that enables online sex trafficking 
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because it is considered a relatively safe and 
protected platform on which to advertise. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Twenty years ago, Congress enacted the 
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) for the 
primary purpose of preventing children from viewing 
indecent or otherwise harmful material online.  As 
one sponsor of the legislation explained, the CDA 
represented an effort to “clean up the Internet—or 
the information superhighway, as it is frequently 
called—to make that superhighway a safe place for 
our children and our families to travel on.”  141 
Cong. Rec. S8087 (daily ed. June 9, 1995) (statement 
of Sen. Exon). 
The same interest in protecting children led 
Congress to include a provision in the CDA entitled 
“Protection for Private Blocking and Screening of 
Offensive Material,” which is codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230 (“Section 230”).   Section 230 prohibits liablity 
for “Good Samaritan” website operators who publish 
information supplied by third parties or who take 
good faith steps to restrict access to objectionable 
content.  See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).  The legislators who 
supported Section 230 emphasized that its goal was 
“to help encourage the private sector to protect our 
children from being exposed to obscene and indecent 
material on the Internet” by removing liability for 
Internet companies that “make a good faith effort to 
edit the smut from their systems.” 141 Cong. Rec. 
H8471-2 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. 
Goodlatte). 
This Court has not yet interpreted the scope of 
Section 230.  Such review is now critical, however, to 
correct the overbroad interpretation of Section 230 
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that has proliferated among federal courts.  In this 
matter, for example, the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals—like several other courts—interpreted 
Section 230 as providing complete immunity to 
websites that solicit and profit from illegal content so 
long as the legal claims against them bear some 
relationship to online content provided by a third 
party.  See Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 
817 F.3d 12, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2016) (collecting cases 
evincing courts’ “preference for broad construction” of 
Section 230).  Because Backpage’s “adult” services 
section contains advertisements written by paid 
users, the First Circuit held that the site was 
protected from liability for aiding the Petitioners’ 
sexual exploitation as minors, even though the 
Petitioners persuasively alleged that Backpage took 
an active role in shaping the content of the ads and 
deliberately tailored its website to “make sex 
trafficking easier.”  Id. at 29.  In other words, the 
First Circuit granted Backpage immunity under 
Section 230 for deliberately facilitating the sex 
trafficking of the Petitioners when they were 
children. 
  This sweeping interpretation of Section 230 is 
not what Congress intended when it enacted 
legislation seeking to encourage website operators to 
behave responsibly.  Indeed, the First Circuit’s 
interpretation is particularly nonsensical because it 
interprets Section 230 in a manner that directly 
undermines the statute’s goal of protecting children 
from obscenity.   
Given the importance of interpreting Section 230 
in a manner consistent with its purpose and the 
harm that will result from the First Circuit’s 
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overbroad interpretation, amici respectually ask that 
this Court grant the petition for certiorari.  
ARGUMENT 
I. SECTION 230 WAS NOT INTENDED TO 
PROVIDE WEBSITE OPERATORS WITH 
BLANKET “IMMUNITY” FOR THEIR 
ILLEGAL ACTS.  
Congress enacted Section 230 in 1996 to 
encourage Internet content providers to take 
affirmative actions to prevent obscene materials from 
reaching children by providing them with a limited 
defense from liability.  The title of the provision, 
“Protection for Private Blocking and Screening of 
Offensive Material,” makes clear that Congress 
intended Section 230 to serve as a shield for 
companies that protect children, rather than as a 
blanket grant of immunity to websites that facilitate 
sex crimes against children. 
Section 230 contains two provisions that exempt 
website operators (and other services responsible for 
providing content to Internet users) from liability 
under certain circumstances.  The first, Subsection 
(c)(1), precludes claims against websites that seek to 
treat them “as a publisher or speaker” of information 
provided by third parties.  The second, 
Subsection (c)(2), protects websites that engage in 
good faith conduct to restrict access to objectionable 
material (or to help others restrict such access).  Both 
subsections are contained under the subheading, 
“Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ Blocking and 
Screening of Offensive Material.” 
Most courts, including the First Circuit, have 
misconstrued Subsection (c)(1) to create “immunity” 
from all civil and state criminal liability for websites 
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that contain content authored in part by someone 
other than the operator of the site.  This misguided 
interpretation has allowed criminal activity to 
flourish online, because the prevailing judicial view 
trends towards exonerating any behavior—no matter 
how harmful—so long as it takes place online and 
bears some relationship to third-party content.  See, 
e.g., Witkoff v. Topix LLC, No. B257656, 2015 WL 
5297912, at *6-7 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2015), as 
modified (Sept. 18, 2015) (affirming the trial court’s 
holding that Section 230 protected a website 
allegedly designed to facilitate drug trafficking from 
liability related to the overdose of a user); Gibson v. 
Craigslist, No. 08-cv-7735, 2009 WL 1704355, at *3-4 
(S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009) (holding that Section 230 
barred a claim against Craigslist for publishing an 
advertisement that sold the handgun used to shoot 
the plaintiff).   
But as the Ninth Circuit observed, Section 230 
was not meant to “create a lawless no-man’s-land on 
the Internet.”  Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando 
Valley v. Roomates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th 
Cir. 2008).  Instead, the section was only intended to 
provide a defense to website operators acting in good 
faith who do not have knowledge of the harmful 
content on their sites.  Congress never could have 
anticipated that courts would extend Section 230’s 
protection to websites like Backpage that willfully 
solicit (and profit from) the sexual exploitation of 
children. 
This Court has long recognized that a statute 
should not be interpreted “to produce a result at odds 
with the purposes underlying the statute” but rather 
“in a way that will further Congress’ overriding 
objective.”  Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 
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36, 56 (1983).  In light of the First Circuit’s departure 
from this fundamental principle, it is critically 
important that this Court grant review to realign the 
judicial interpretation of Section 230 with its 
legislative purpose. 
A. Congress Only Intended For Section 230 
To Protect Websites From Facing 
Liability As Publishers Of Third Party 
Content, Retaining Distributor Liability 
For Knowing Violations Of The Law. 
 Congress enacted Section 230 as a direct 
response to Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy 
Services Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 
1995).  See H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996); 141 
Cong. Rec. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement 
of Rep. Cox) (stating, in introducing Section 230, that 
it would “protect” website operators “from taking on 
liability such as occurred in the Prodigy case in New 
York”).  
Given this origin, it is important to analyze what 
occurred in the Stratton case.  The defendant, 
Prodigy, hosted a group of online message boards 
that were moderated to delete messages that 
exhibited “offensiveness and bad taste . . . .”  
Stratton, 1995 WL 323710 at *4 (internal citation 
omitted).  On one such message board, Money Talk, a 
user posted that the plaintiffs’ securities investment 
firm was a “major criminal fraud” filled with brokers 
“who either lie for a living or get fired.”  Id. at *1 
(internal citation omitted). Plaintiffs sued for 
defamation.  
The primary legal issue in the case was whether 
Prodigy should be treated as a “publisher” or 
“distributor” of the message.  Id. at *3.  This 
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distinction materially impacted Prodigy’s potential 
liability, because under a traditional pre-Internet 
defamation analysis, a publisher can be liable for 
reprinting a statement even without knowledge of its 
defamatory nature.  See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 
306, 314 n.8 (1974) (the “republication of a libel” is 
“generally unprotected”); Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 578 (“[O]ne who repeats or otherwise 
republishes defamatory matter is subject to liability 
as if he had originally published it.”).  Distributors 
“such as book stores and libraries,” however, “may be 
liable for defamatory statements of others only if 
they knew or had reason to know of the defamatory 
statement at issue.”  Stratton, 1995 WL 323710 at *3.   
In Stratton, the court noted that online message 
boards “should generally be regarded in the same 
context as bookstores, libraries and network 
affiliates”—e.g., as mere distributors, rather than 
publishers.  Id. at *5.  However, because Prodigy 
monitored the content of its sites, the court found 
that it “exercised sufficient editorial control over its 
computer bulletin boards to render it a publisher 
with the same responsibilities as a newspaper.”  Id.  
at *3.  In other words, Prodigy’s laudable attempts to 
filter and remove indecent material from its website 
increased its potential liability by making it 
responsible for any inappropriate content on its site.   
Finding this holding bad for public policy, 
Congress enacted Section 230 as an amendment to 
the CDA.  The House Conference Report for the 
legislation that would become Section 230 explains: 
One of the specific purposes of this section is 
to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and 
any other similar decisions which have treated 
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such providers and users as publishers or 
speakers of content that is not their own 
because they have restricted access to 
objectionable material. The conferees believe 
that such decisions create serious obstacles to 
the important federal policy of empowering 
parents to determine the content of 
communications their children receive through 
interactive computer services. 
H.R. Conf. Rep. 104-458 at 194 (1996). 
Representative Cox, a sponsor of the amendment, 
stated that that goal of the legislation was to 
encourage operators to monitor online content by 
protecting them from the type of liability that had 
arisen in Stratton.  141 Cong. Rec. H8470 (daily ed. 
Aug. 4, 1995).  Representative Cox was clear that 
websites should not face Stratton-type liablity “for 
helping us and for helping us solve” the problem of 
harmful content on the Internet through increased 
self-monitoring.  Id. 
Thus, when Congress said it wanted to overrule 
Stratton, it simply meant that it wanted to remove 
the higher standard of publisher liability that 
Stratton applied for websites exercising editorial 
functions—particularly where those functions would 
protect children from accessing obscene or 
inappopriate materials.  See 141 Cong. Rec. S8345 
(daily ed. June 14, 1995) (statement of Sen. Coats) 
(stating that the goal of Section 230 was to  ensure 
that “a company who tries to prevent obscene or 
indecent material under this section” would not be 
“held liable as a publisher for defamatory statements 
for which they would not otherwise have been 
liable”).  Indeed, the plain language of Section 230 
states that websites may not “be treated as the 
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publisher or speaker” of information provided by 
others, but says nothing about liability as 
distributors of that information.   47 U.S.C. § 230(c).   
In fact, distributor liability, which attaches when 
a website operator “knew or had reason to know” of 
the challenged content on its site, is precisely the 
type of liability that Congress intended to preserve.  
Stratton, 1995 WL 323710 at *3.  Notably, in 
overruling Stratton, Congress did not mention 
another key decision, Cubby v. Compuserve Inc., 776 
F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), which held that 
websites are “the functional equivalent of a more 
traditional news vendor” and thus should generally 
be treated as distributors for libel claims made 
against them based on third-party content.  Id. at 
140-41.  Anything less, the Cubby court held, “would 
impose an undue burden on the free flow of 
information.”  Id. at 140.  In that case, the court 
ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of 
the defendant, the issuer of a general online 
information service, because there was nothing to 
show that it “knew or had reason to know of the” 
defamatory statements on its service.  Id. at 141.  
Congress, which never referred to Cubby or 
distributor liability at all, apparently observed no 
error in this decision.  There is therefore no reason to 
believe that Congress intended to supplant the 
existence of distributor liability through Section 230.  
Thus, Congress did not enact Section 230 to 
provide widespread immunity for knowing, willful 
violations of the law that occur through the Internet.  
Instead, Congress intended only that websites not 
face the heightened standard of liability that applies 
to “publishers”—as opposed to “distributors”—under 
a traditional defamation law analysis.   
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The courts that have considered this issue have 
largely disregarded the foregoing legislative history 
and have instead interpreted Section 230 expansively 
to obscure the distinction between liability for 
publishers and distributors.  This broad 
interpretation originated with Zeran v. America 
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), the first 
case to consider the scope of Section 230.  There, the 
Fourth Circuit rejected the argument that distributor 
liability remained following the enactment of Section 
230, instead holding that the “plain language” of the 
statute “creates a federal immunity to any cause of 
action that would make service providers liable for 
information originating with a third-party user of the 
service.”  Id. at 330.  Several circuit courts have 
adopted this interpretation, often with little more 
than a cursory analysis.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Arden, 
614 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir. 2010) (relying on Zeran 
for the proposition that Section 230 immunized the 
defendant from liability “for material originating 
with a third party”).2 
The Fourth Circuit’s conflation of publisher and 
distributor liability is unsound, particularly when 
applied to a case such as this one. Under a 
distributor liability analysis, a content distributor 
may be liable only when it has knowledge of the 
                                                          
2 Not all courts have agreed, however.  The Seventh 
Circuit, for example,  recognized that Section 230 “as 
a whole cannot be understood as a general 
prohibition of civil liability for web-site operators and 
other online content hosts.”   See Chicago Lawyers’ 
Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, 
Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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challenged content but distributes it anyway.  Here, 
Backpage has concrete knowledge about the 
underage sex trafficking that is occurring on its 
website—indeed, it affirmatively encourages, and 
profits from, this activity.  See Jane Doe No. 1, 817 
F.3d at 17, 20-21.  Congress cannot have intended to 
“immunize” such willful conduct—in fact, the word 
“immunity” does not appear in Section 230 at all.  
Review of the First Circuit’s decision is necessary to 
give this Court an opportunity to resolve confusion in 
the Courts of Appeals by explaining that, as its 
legislative history makes clear, Section 230 does not 
protect websites that knowingly facilitate illegal 
activities.   
B. Courts Should Interpret Section 230 In 
Accordance With Its Purpose Of  
Protecting Children From Harmful 
Materials And Encouraging Good Faith 
Content Monitoring. 
It is beyond dispute that Congress’ primary 
purpose in enacting the CDA was to protect children 
from viewing harmful content.  See H.R. Conf. Rep. 
104-458 at 193 (1996) (through the CDA, Congress 
sought to “take effective action to protect children 
and families from online harm”); 141 Cong. Rec. 
S8088 (daily ed. June 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
Exon) (“The fundamental purpose of the 
Communications Decency Act is to provide much-
needed protection for children.”); 141 Cong. Rec. 
S8089 (daily ed. June 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
Exon) (“The heart and the soul of the 
Communications Decency Act are its protection for 
families and children.”).  As Senator Exon, a sponsor 
of the legislation, further explained: 
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[T]he information superhighway should not 
become a red light district.  This legislation 
will keep that from happening and extend the 
standards of decency which have protected 
telephone users to new telecommunications 
devices. 
Once passed, our children and families will be 
better protected from those who would 
electronically cruise the digital world to 
engage children in inappropriate 
communciations and introductions. 
141 Cong. Rec. S1953 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995) 
(statement of Sen. Exon).   
A similar desire to protect underage Internet 
users drove the enactment of the amendment that 
became Section 230. Representative Cox, a co-
sponsor of the amendment, said: 
As the parent of two, I want to make sure that 
my children have access to this future and that 
I do not have to worry about what they might 
be running into on line.  I would like to keep 
that out of my house and off of my computer.  
141 Cong. Rec. H8469 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995).  
Another co-sponsor of the amendment echoed this 
sentiment: 
We are all against smut and pornography, and, 
as the parents of two small computer-literate 
children, my wife and I have seen our kids find 
their way into these chat rooms that make 
their middle-aged parents cringe.  So let us all 
stipulate right at the outset the importance of 
protecting our kids and going to the issue of the 
best way to do it. 
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141 Cong. Rec. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) 
(statement of Rep. Wyden). 
In keeping with this purpose, Section 230 was 
introduced “to encourage the development of 
technologies which maximize user control over what 
information is received by individuals, families, and 
schools who use the Internet and other interactive 
computer services” and “to remove disincentives for 
the development and utilization of blocking and 
filtering technologies that empower parents to 
restrict their children’s access to objectionable or 
inappropriate online material.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(b).  
In other words, Congress’ goal in enacting Section 
230 was “to help encourage the private sector to 
protect our children from being exposed to obscene 
and indecent material on the Internet” by removing 
“the liability of providers such as Prodigy who 
currently make a good faith effort to edit the smut 
from their systems.” 141 Cong. Rec. H8471-72 (daily 
ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte).   
Congress hoped that the increased incentives for 
self-regulation would obviate the need for 
government regulation, which many legislators 
believed would impede the development of “[t]he 
Internet and other interactive computer services.”  
Id. § 230(a)(4); see 141 Cong. Rec. H8470 (daily ed. 
Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox) (stating that 
the amendment creating Section 230 “will establish 
as the policy of the United States that we do not wish 
to have content regulation by the Federal 
Government of what is on the Internet, that we do 
not wish to have a Federal Computer Commission 
with an army of bureaucrats regulating the Internet 
because frankly the Internet has grown up to be 
what it is without that kind of help from the 
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Government”).  In fact, on the day that the 
amendment passed the House of Representatives, 
the Congressional Record’s Daily Digest reported 
that the amendment had the twin aims of protecting 
“from liability those providers and users seeking to 
clean up the Internet and prohibiting the FCC from 
imposing content or any regulation of the Internet.”  
141 Cong. Rec. D993 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995). 
Congress’ desire to avoid federal regulation of the 
Internet does not mean that Congress sought to 
create full-fledged immunity for all willful 
misconduct that occurs online.  In fact, the legislative 
history indicates precisely the opposite—Congress 
wanted to retain traditional liability for entities with 
knowledge of misconduct and others acting in bad 
faith.  It is no coindence that both Section 230 
defenses are contained under a heading stating that 
they are meant to apply only to a “Good Samaritan.”  
In introducing the amendment, Representative Cox 
said the purpose of the language was to avoid 
regulation and to “protect computer Good 
Samaritans, online service providers, anyone who 
provides a front end to the Internet, let us say, who 
takes steps to screen indecency and offensive 
material for their customers.”  141 Cong. Rec. H8470 
(daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 
104-458, at 188 (stating that Section 230 “provides 
‘Good Samaritan’ protections from civil liability for 
providers or users of an interactive computer service 
for actions to restrict or to enable restriction of access 
to objectionable online material”).  And the House 
Conference Report, in describing proposed defenses 
to liability similar to those incorporated in Section 
230, stated that they would “assure that attention is 
focused on bad actors and not those who lack 
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knowledge of a violation or whose actions are 
equivalent to those of common carriers.”  H.R. Conf. 
Rep. No. 104-458, at 188.  Thus, Congress never 
intended for “bad actors” to escape liability through 
the use of Section 230. 
This is confirmed elsewhere in the legislative 
history by statements from the bill’s sponsors about 
the type of substantive liability created by the CDA.  
In describing conduct that would constitute a 
substantive violation of the CDA’s obscenity 
provision, Senator Exon contemplated liability for an 
access provider if it “were to create a menu to assist 
its customers in finding the pornographic areas of the 
network” or if “the service provider is owned or 
controlled by or is in conspiracy with a maker of 
communications that is determined to be in violation 
of this statute.”  141 Cong. Rec. S8345 (daily ed. June 
14, 1995).  Similarly, co-sponsor Senator Coats stated 
that the CDA permitted liability for “someone who, 
among other things, manages the prohibited or 
restricted material, charges a fee for such material, 
provides instructions on how to access such material 
or provides an index of the material.”  Id.  A few 
weeks after those statements, both the House and 
the Senate enacted a version of the CDA that 
included Section 230.  At no point did any legislator 
ever suggest that the liability contemplated by 
Senators Exon and Coats had somehow been 
eviscerated by the defenses in Section 230.   
The text and legislative history of Section 230 
demonstrate that only “Good Samaritans” who do not 
actively solicit illegal content enjoy immunity from 
suit.  Backpage’s adult services section, the largest 
sex trafficking website in the United States, does not 
qualify for Section 230 protection.  Given how far 
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courts have deviated from the purpose and legislative 
intent of Congress in interpreting Section 230, this 
Court should grant review to clarify the importance 
of the statute’s “Good Samaritan” requirement. 
II. IT IS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT THAT 
THIS COURT GRANT REVIEW TO 
ENSURE SECTION 230 IS NOT USED TO 
PROTECT WEBSITES THAT FACILITATE 
SEX TRAFFICKING. 
The foregoing makes clear that Congress never 
intended for Section 230 to impede the vigorous 
enforcement of state criminal laws and civil laws 
that deter the type of illegal conduct occurring daily 
on Backpage.  The fact that Backpage earns money 
from sex trafficking by hosting advertisements 
online, as opposed to using some other medium, 
should not exempt it from all liability for knowingly 
profiting from criminal activity. 
A recent report by the Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations stated that the 
Internet “has become an increasingly central 
marketplace for human trafficking in the United 
States.”  Staff of S. Permanent Subcomm. On 
Investigations, 114th Cong., Recommendation to 
Enforce a Subpoena Issued to CEO of Backpage.com, 
LLC at 31 (hereinafter, the “PSI Staff Report”), 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investig
ations/hearings/human-trafficking-investigation. 
With respect to children, who make up more than 
half of all sex trafficking victims, experts have 
explained that the 846% increase in reports of 
suspected trafficking over the past five years is 
“directly correlated to the increased use of the 
Internet to sell children for sex.”  Id. at 4 (quoting 
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Testimony of Yiota G. Souras, Senior Vice President 
& General Counsel, National Center for Missing & 
Exploited Children, before S. Permanent Subcomm. 
on Investigations, at 2 (Nov. 19, 2015)). 
Backpage is the single largest facilitator of sex 
trafficking in the United States.  Id. at App. 40, 47.  
The Senate’s recent investigation into Backpage’s 
practices shows both that Backpage is keenly aware 
of the sex trafficking rampant on its website and that 
Backpage does not monitor advertisements in good 
faith.  In fact, the PSI Staff Report strongly suggests 
that Backpage has altered advertisements for the 
purpose of concealing evidence of criminality.  See 
PSI Staff Report at 21 (“Backpage’s moderation 
process operated to remove explicit references to the 
likely illegality of the underlying transaction—not to 
prevent illegal conduct from taking place on its 
site.”).  Thus, Backpage is not the type of innocent 
content provider that is entitled to the protection of 
Section 230.  The First Circuit’s ruling to the 
contrary cannot possibly be reconciled with the text, 
purpose, and legislative history of Section 230. 
The fact that websites like Backpage have been 
permitted to facilitate criminal activity with 
impunity creates a grave risk of harm to the public.  
It is therefore critical that this Court grant review to 
realign the judicial interpretation of Section 230 with 
the purpose and legislative intent of the statute. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant 
the Petition for Certiorari to review the First 
Circuit’s decision in this matter. 
 

